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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 29, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable 
Lucy H. Koh, defendant Google Inc. (“Google”) will and hereby does move the Court to certify its 
September 26, 2013 Order, ECF No. 70 (the “Order”) denying in part Google’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual and Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) for 
interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Google’s motion is based upon 
this notice, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the pleadings on file in 
these actions, arguments of counsel, and any other matters that the Court deems appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
1. Whether the Court should certify the Order for interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C.  § 1292(b) because it involves the following controlling questions of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and because an immediate appeal may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation: 
a. Whether automated scanning of emails like that performed by Google in 
providing Google services falls within the “ordinary course of its business” 
exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii), to federal wiretapping liability under 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). 
b. Whether automated scanning of emails like that performed by Google is 
protected by the “prior consent” exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), to 
federal wiretapping liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Court’s ruling that Google might be found liable for illegal wiretapping because of its 
operation of its Gmail system made national headlines,1 and has already spurred copycat litigation 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, No, Gmail’s Ad-Targeting Isn’t Wiretapping, WASHINGTON POST, 
Sept. 28, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/09/28/heres-whats-wrong-with-this-weeks-ruling-that-google-may-be-
(footnote continued) 
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against other email service providers.2  Such widespread attention is not surprising, for the Court’s 
ruling was a novel interpretation of wiretapping statutes enacted and amended by Congress long 
before the rise of the Internet and never since updated to reflect the new technological and 
commercial realities of the Internet age.  Few questions could be more appropriate for 
interlocutory review to the Ninth Circuit in order to obtain guidance on whether the Court’s novel 
interpretation of now-antiquated statutory provisions in an unanticipated context is correct. 
First, the Order presents two controlling questions of law, neither of which has ever been 
addressed by the Ninth Circuit:  namely, the scope of the “ordinary course of its business” 
exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii), as applied to Internet services like Google’s automated 
scanning of Gmail users’ emails for the alleged purpose of creating targeted email advertisements 
and user profiles; and the scope of the “prior consent to … interception” exception under 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), as applied to such email services as Gmail in light of Google’s Terms of 
Service and Privacy Policies and users’ awareness of automated processing of emails.  Each 
question depends on interpretation of the text, structure, and legislative history of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), purely legal questions that are appropriate for the 
Circuit’s de novo review. 
Second, a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists as to resolution of these novel 
issues of law, and reasonable judges examining the same text, legislative history, and sparse case 
law could well arrive at different conclusions.  For example, while the Court construed the term 
“business” in the phrase “ordinary course of its business” as narrowly limited to “the transmission 
of emails,” a reasonable jurist could give “business” a broader interpretation based on the text of 
the statute.  A reasonable jurist could also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that “consent” to 
“interception” requires consenting to the particular purposes for which interception is used. 
                                                                                                                                                                
wiretapping-its-customers/; Claire Cain Miller, Google Accused of Wiretapping in Gmail Scans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/technology/google-
accused-of-wiretapping-in-gmail-scans.html. 
2 See, e.g., Kevranian v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-04547-HRL, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 
2013). 
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Third, an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation.  Reversal on either issue would warrant dismissal of the federal claims (and by 
extension the parallel state claims), sparing the parties and the Court from wasting resources on 
discovery and trial.  And if the Ninth Circuit affirms this Court’s rulings, its guidance on these 
issues will help ensure the proper conduct of the remainder of the case and provide important 
guidance for other companies facing the same issues.   
For all these reasons, Google respectfully submits that the Order presents such important 
issues of first impression on controlling questions of law that certification for interlocutory appeal 
is warranted.  For similar reasons, this Court certified for interlocutory review an order denying a 
motion to dismiss a class action in In re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communications 
Litigation, No. C 10-md-02184 JW, ECF No. 90 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011) (Ware, J.), which 
likewise presented novel questions about the construction of ECPA in the Internet context.  Here, 
as in Street View, the Order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a credible 
basis for a difference of opinion” and “certification would materially advance the litigation under 
Section 1292(b).”  Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).  And here, as in Street View, because “novel 
questions of first impression are presented,” there is reason to “find that a substantial ground for 
difference of opinion exists’ … ‘without first awaiting development of contradictory precedent.’”  
Id. at 2 n.2 (citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Google and Gmail 
Google is one of the most successful technology companies in the world.  Google offers a 
suite of free web-based products to billions of people worldwide—most notably, its eponymous 
search engine, as well as other services such as its video-sharing service, YouTube, and its email 
service, Gmail.  Google offers Gmail accounts, as it does most of its services, free of charge.  And 
receiving displays of targeted advertisements is well understood as a quid pro quo for having a 
free Gmail account—much as watching television commercials is a necessary corollary of 
watching a program on a broadcast network.  Revenues derived from such advertisements are 
what allow Google to provide Gmail free to over 400 million users worldwide. 
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The more targeted the ad, the more relevant and valuable it is to both the consumer and the 
advertiser.  Thus, as part of delivering pertinent advertisements to Gmail users, Google’s 
automated systems analyze words contained in emails transmitted on the Gmail system.  The 
results of this automated scanning are used to improve Google’s services and to enable Google to 
continue to provide Gmail for free.3 
B. Google’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policies 
 While Google’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) and Privacy Policies in effect during the class 
period underwent revisions, the core of those policies as relevant to this action has been consistent.  
These policies expressly cover all Google services, including Gmail—there is no dispute that the 
Gmail service is one of the many “Services” included in Google’s TOS and Privacy Policies.  
Before March 1, 2012, the TOS provided in relevant part that:  “Some of the Services are 
supported by advertising revenue and may display advertisements and promotions.  These 
advertisements may be targeted to the content of information stored on the Services, queries made 
through the Services or other information.”  (Rothman Decl., Ex. E ¶ 17 (emphasis added).)  The 
TOS also provided that “Google reserves the right … to pre-screen, review, flag, [or] filter … any 
or all Content from any Service.”  (Id. ¶ 8.3.)4  After March 1, 2012, these provisions were revised 
to inform users that, when they “upload or otherwise submit content to our Services,” they give 
Google “a worldwide license to use … [and] create derivative works (such as those resulting from 
translations, adaptations or other changes we make so that your content works better with our 
Services) … and distribute such content[] … for the limited purposes of operating, promoting, and 
improving our Services, and to develop new ones.”  (Rothman Decl., Ex. F.) 
The Privacy Policy, which is incorporated into the TOS, provides in relevant part: 
When you share information with us, for example by creating a Google Account, 
we can make those services even better – to show you more relevant search results 
and ads, to help you connect with people or to make sharing with others quicker 
                                                 
3 The arguments herein apply to all of the forms of Gmail implicated by the Complaint, 
including Google’s operation of email on behalf of Internet Service Providers and Google Apps 
for Education.  (See Order at 3-4.) 
4 “Content” is defined as “all information ... which you may have access to as part of, or through 
your use of, the Services.”  (Rothman Decl., Ex. E ¶ 8.1.) 
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and easier.  As you use our services, we want you to be clear how we’re using 
information and the ways in which you can protect your privacy. … 
We collect information to provide better services to all of our users – from figuring 
out basic stuff like which language you speak, to more complex things like which 
ads you’ll find most useful or the people who matter most to you online. … 
Information we get from your use of our services.  We may collect information 
about the services that you use and how you use them, like when you visit a website 
that uses our advertising services or you view and interact with our ads and content. 
This information includes [device information; log information, which “may 
include” details of use of service, telephony log information, Internet protocol 
address, device event information, and cookies; location information; unique 
application numbers; local storage; and cookies and anonymous identifiers].… 
We use the information we collect from all of our services to provide, maintain, 
protect and improve them, to develop new ones, and to protect Google and our 
users.  We also use this information to offer you tailored content – like giving you 
more relevant search results and ads.… 
(Rothman Decl., Ex. J) (emphases added).5 
C. The Order 
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Google’s automated scanning of emails violates 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1)(a) of ECPA.  In denying Google’s motion to dismiss, this Court rejected (Order at 13-
22) Google’s argument (ECF No. 44 at 6-13) that automated scanning of users’ emails to improve 
Google’s services is not an “interception” under ECPA because any such scanning is subject to the 
“ordinary course of … business” exception set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).  The Court held 
that “[t]he exception offers protection from liability only where an electronic communication 
service provider’s interception facilitates the transmission of the communication at issue or is 
incidental to the transmission of such communication.”  (Order at 13 (emphasis added); see also 
id. at 15.)  And the Court further narrowed the “ordinary course of … business” exception by 
stating that “the exception would apply here only if the alleged interceptions were an instrumental 
part of the transmission of email.”  (Id. at 13 (emphases added).)  The Court also held that, 
                                                 
5 Before March 1, 2012, Google’s Privacy Policy had similar language.  (See, e.g., Rothman 
Decl., Ex. G. (“In order to provide our full range of services, we may collect the following types 
of information,” including “[i]nformation you provide,” “[c]ookies,” “[l]og information,” “[u]ser 
communications,” “[a]ffiliated sites,” “[l]inks,” and “[o]ther sites” for purposes including “the 
display of customized content and advertising” and “[d]eveloping new services”).)  Additional 
terms are also applicable as to certain types of users and in certain time periods. 
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because Google’s Privacy Policies allegedly did not specify that the content of emails that pass 
through Gmail systems may be used for targeted advertising or creating alleged user profiles, 
Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged “that Google exceeded the scope of its own Privacy Policy, [and 
thus] the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception cannot apply.”  (Id. at 22.) 
The Court also rejected (Order at 22-28) Google’s alternative argument (ECF No. 44 at 13-
14) that “the senders and recipients of the emails at issue have all necessarily consented to the 
processing of their emails by Google,” both expressly insofar as Gmail users agree to Google’s 
Terms of Service and Privacy Policies (id. at 13-16), and impliedly insofar as non-Gmail users 
understand and accept that email is automatically processed (id. 19-21.)  The Court held that 
Gmail users’ acceptance of Google’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policies “does not establish 
explicit consent” (id. at 24) and that “non-Gmail users” not subject to Google’s Terms of Service 
or Privacy Policies have not “impliedly consented to Google’s interception of their emails to 
Gmail users” (id. at 28). 
As the Court agreed, Plaintiffs’ claims under Maryland’s and Florida’s respective anti-
wiretapping statutes are derivative of, and thus rise and fall with, Plaintiffs’ ECPA claims.  (Order 
at 42.)  The Court dismissed claims brought under CIPA § 632 (id. at 40-42) and Pennsylvania’s 
anti-wiretapping statute (id. at 43), and while the Court granted leave to amend these claims, 
Plaintiffs have informed Google (ECF No. 72 at 2) they do not intend to do so.   
ARGUMENT 
Google respectfully requests that the Court certify two discrete issues for interlocutory 
appellate review: 
1. Whether automated scanning of emails like that performed by Google in providing 
Google services falls within the “ordinary course of its business” exception, 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii), to federal wiretapping liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). 
2. Whether automated scanning of emails like that performed by Google is protected 
by the “prior consent” exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), to federal wiretapping 
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). 
A district court may, in its discretion, certify an order for interlocutory appeal if it: 
(1) “involves a controlling question of law”; (2) on which there is “substantial ground for 
difference of opinion”; and (3) “an immediate appeal  … may materially advance the ultimate 
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termination of the litigation.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  See, e.g., Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug 
Stores Cal., L.L.C., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130-31 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying order for 
interlocutory appeal); Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. Sandisk Corp., 2011 WL 3957257, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (same).  And where an order “involves a new legal question or is of 
special consequence,” a district court “should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal.”  
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 111 (2009) (emphasis added).  
Because each of these requirements is easily satisfied here as to both issues presented, the 
Court “should not hesitate” to grant the instant motion.  Id. 
I. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE QUESTION OF THE PROPER SCOPE 
OF THE “ORDINARY COURSE OF ITS BUSINESS” EXCEPTION UNDER 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii) 
ECPA in relevant part permits an action against any person who “intentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).  “Intercept” is defined as “the aural 
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use 
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  Id. § 2510(4).  However, the definition of 
“electronic, mechanical, or other device” excludes:  
any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component 
thereof,  
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by 
the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such 
subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the 
ordinary course of its business; or  
(ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the 
ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement 
officer in the ordinary course of his duties; …. 
 
Id. § 2510(5)(a) (emphasis added).  Thus, use of equipment or a facility by an electronic 
communication service (“ECS”) “in the ordinary course of its business” is not an interception 
under § 2511(1)(a).   
In construing § 2510(5)(a)(ii), the Court held that the phrase “ordinary course of its 
business” requires that the ECS provider “demonstrate the interception facilitated the 
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communication service or was incidental to the functioning of the provided communication 
service.”  (Order at 15.)  According to the Court, under such a construction, the Complaint 
plausibly alleges that “there is no … nexus between Google’s interceptions and its ability to 
provide the electronic communication service at issue in this case,” (id. at 19), with that service 
narrowly defined as “transmission of email” (id. at 13.)  The Court further held, based on a D.C. 
Circuit decision involving § 2510(5)(a)(i), that Google’s actions fall outside the “ordinary course 
of its business” exception of § 2510(5)(a)(ii) because Plaintiffs plausibly allege that “Google’s 
Privacy Policies explicitly limit the information that Google may collect to an enumerated list of 
items, and that this list does not include the content of emails.” (Order at 21 (citing Berry v. Funk, 
146 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).) 
The Court’s ruling on its construction of § 2510(5)(a)(ii) involves a controlling question of 
law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and as to which an immediate 
appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  The Court should 
therefore certify the Order on this issue. 
A. Interpretation of the “Ordinary Course of Its Business” Exception Involves a 
Controlling Question of Law 
The Court resolved a pure question of law that will be subject to de novo review on appeal:  
the proper construction of a provision of ECPA.  See, e.g., Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 
F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We … review de novo a district court’s interpretation and 
construction of a federal statute.”); Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., 
Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (similar).6  As the Court explained, its construction of 
§ 2510(5)(a)(ii) was based on the “statutory text, case law, statutory scheme, and legislative 
history” of the provision.  (Order at 19.)  These are purely legal inquiries, not dependent on a 
factual record. 
                                                 
6 The Ninth Circuit has also accepted § 1292(b) certifications for questions involving 
application of law to a particular set of facts where the legal conclusion was sufficiently important.  
See Steering Comm. v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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In addition, the issue is “controlling” because “resolution of the issue on appeal could 
materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.”  In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 
F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982).  “Although resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate 
an action in order to be ‘controlling,’ it is clear that a question of law is ‘controlling’ if reversal of 
the district court’s order would terminate the action.”  Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed 
Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).  Here, reversal of the Order on this issue could terminate 
the entire action.7  See, e.g., Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 
2011) (controlling question where reversal would remove most claims, noting that “neither 
§ 1292(b)’s literal text nor controlling precedent requires that the interlocutory appeal have a final, 
dispositive effect on the litigation”); In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., No. C 
10-md-02184 JW, ECF No. 90 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011) (certifying order for review of ECPA 
question, notwithstanding grant of leave to amend state-law claim).  In addition, permitting 
appellate review on this issue at an early stage will avoid the significant costs and burdens of class 
certification, discovery, depositions, expert discovery, and motion practice—all of which may be 
unnecessary if the Ninth Circuit reverses.  See, e.g., Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners Inc., 2009 
WL 2058541, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2009) (certifying order that turned on interpretation of 
federal statute that was an issue “of first impression in the Ninth Circuit” because “[i]t would be 
                                                 
7 The fact that a single state-law claim under CIPA § 631 might remain should not bar 
certification.  The Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ § 631 claim itself presents a controlling question of 
law for which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion.  As the Court noted, “there is 
no binding authority with respect to whether section 631 applies to email,” and thus the Court 
determined that it “must predict what the California Supreme Court would do if confronted with 
the issue.”  (Order at 36.)  If the Court grants the instant motion, the entire Order would be 
certified and the Court of Appeals “‘may review the entire order, either to consider a question 
different than the one certified as controlling or to decide the case despite the lack of any 
identified controlling question.’”  Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996)).  Because the 
Court’s ruling on the applicability of § 631 to email is part of the same Order in which the Court 
decided the “ordinary course of its business” issue, if the Ninth Circuit were to consider and 
reverse both holdings, the action would be terminated in its entirety, without regard to the issue of 
consent. 
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preferable … to address the issue now, rather than to require the parties … to expend significant 
time and resources”). 
Finally, this question may have widespread effects on a broad swath of internet industries, 
and thus presents an issue of important precedential value for other cases.  See Klinghoffer, 921 
F.2d at 24 (“the impact that an appeal will have on other cases is a factor” in determining whether 
a question is controlling).  As Internet-based businesses continue to grow in unexpected ways 
beyond what anyone could have ever predicted when ECPA was passed in 1986, these important 
questions will only arise more frequently.  Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. 
Supp. 1, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.) (“[t]he shared interests of large research corporations and 
the publishing community would be importantly served by an immediate appeal, clarifying these 
questions”).  The interests of Internet-based businesses, ECS providers, and the general public 
thus would be served by receiving immediate appellate clarification on this issue.  Further, there is 
every indication that the number of lawsuits on this issue will increase—not only does this class 
action incorporate six separate complaints gathered from across the Nation, but just one week after 
the Court issued the Order another class action was filed in this District against Yahoo alleging 
claims materially identical to those here.  See Kevranian v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-04547-HRL, 
ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013).8  Expeditious resolution of this issue will thus conserve 
judicial resources for this Court in this case, and for courts in similar cases.  
B. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion Exists as to the Proper 
Construction of the “Ordinary Course of Its Business” Exception 
“Courts traditionally will find that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists 
where ‘the circuits are in dispute on the question and the court of appeals of the circuit has not 
spoken on the point, if complicated questions arise under foreign law, or if novel and difficult 
questions of first impression are presented.’”  Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 
2010) (quoting 3 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 3:212 (2010)) (footnotes omitted); 
                                                 
8 In addition, the Order has been submitted to courts in other Wiretap Act cases.  See, e.g., In re 
Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 12-cv-1382 PSG, ECF No. 65, Ex. A (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 
2013); In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 12-md-2358(SLR), ECF 
No. 119, Ex. A (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2013). 
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see also VIA Techs., Inc. v. SonicBlue Claims LLC, 2011 WL 2437452, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 
2011) (“Substantial grounds for a difference of opinion … arise when an issue involves one or 
more difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled by controlling authority.”).  As the Ninth 
Circuit recently explained: 
Our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction does not turn on a prior court’s having 
reached a conclusion adverse to that from which appellants seek relief.  A 
substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might 
disagree on an issue’s resolution, not merely where they have already disagreed.  
Stated another way, when novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded 
jurists might reach contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be certified for 
interlocutory appeal without first awaiting development of contradictory precedent. 
Reese, 643 F.3d at 688 (footnote omitted).9 
Applying these principles here, substantial ground exists for disagreement with the Court’s 
conclusion that the “ordinary course of its business” exception is available only where the 
interception facilitated the “transmission of email” (Order at 13).  To the contrary, the plain text of 
the statute suggests that the exception applies where the interception assists the overall business of 
which email service is part.  This is a novel issue, and fair-minded people may disagree on the 
interpretation and persuasive value of the statutory text, analogous case law and legislative history.  
Moreover, there is no controlling authority—no other court of which we are aware has construed 
§ 2510(5)(a) as the Court did here.  See VIA Techs., 2011 WL 2437425, at *2 (certifying order 
where “court was unable to locate any definitive authority that answered the exact question raised 
by the … defense”) (emphasis added). 
First, the statutory text of § 2510(5)(a)(ii) alone would allow a fair-minded jurist to 
disagree with the Court.  The text exempts from the definition of “intercept” any use of a device 
                                                 
9 The applicable standard is not whether the Court is confident in its ruling, but rather whether 
others may reasonably disagree. As one court recently explained in certifying an order: 
 
On the issue …, I am convinced that the Decision reflects the better and more 
considered view of the law.  However, if a district court had to believe that her 
decision was likely to be reversed before certifying a question under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), there would be no such certifications.  Probability of reversal is not the 
standard.  The standard is whether there is “substantial ground for disagreement.” 
 
Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 2012 WL 2952929, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). 
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by an ECS provider “in the ordinary course of its business”—not “in the ordinary course of 
transmitting the electronic communication.”  The word “business” is a broad term that, on its face, 
encompasses conduct broader than the mere technological instrumentality of transmitting emails.  
The modification of this phrase with the word “ordinary” demonstrates that Congress intended to 
protect an ECS provider’s customary, routine business practices. 
The significance of the plain text cannot be overstated.  The “first step in interpreting a 
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.”  
Wilson v. C.I.R., 705 F.3d 980, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).  In so doing, the Court 
“must begin with … the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately express 
the legislative purpose.”  de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)).  “If the statutory language is 
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, judicial inquiry must cease.”  
Services Emps. Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of Healthcare Workers, 718 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012)).  In this case, a fair-
minded jurist could disagree with the Court and determine, based on the statutory text alone, that 
Google’s automated scanning of emails to create targeted advertising and alleged user profiles—
all of which indisputably are conducted routinely, and which act to improve and underwrite 
Google’s free services to users—requires reversal.  While there may be gray areas in other 
contexts as to whether the interception is in the course of the ECS provider’s “business” as 
opposed to non-business, no such textual uncertainty exists here.10 
Second, the statutory scheme and legislative history of ECPA permit a conclusion other 
than that reached by the Court.  For example, in describing the statutory structure of ECPA, the 
Court cites to and quotes 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i), which states:  
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication 
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic                                                  
10 The Court’s acknowledgment that “not everything that a company may want to do falls within 
the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception” (Order at 14) is true—and supports Google.  For 
example, the requirement that use of the device be for valid and routine business purposes acts as a 
backstop to any abuse. 
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communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal 
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property 
of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication 
service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring 
except for mechanical or service quality control checks. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Court cites this passage for the proposition that the statute “explicitly 
limits the use of service observing or random monitoring by electronic communication service 
providers to mechanical and service quality control checks.”  (Order at 17.)  This, however, is 
factually incorrect—the statute limits such service observing or random monitoring only as to wire 
communication services, not to electronic communication services.  The statute does not impose 
any limits on ECS providers regarding service observing or random monitoring.  The explicit 
exclusion of ECS providers from this limiting language supports a broad, not narrow, reading of 
§ 2510(5)(a)(ii).  Certainly a reasonable jurist could disagree with the Court’s conclusion. 
The legislative history of ECPA explains why § 2511(2)(a)(i) applies only to wire 
communication service providers and not to ECS providers: 
In applying the second clause only to wire communications, this provision reflects 
an important technical distinction between electronic communications and 
traditional voice telephone service.  The provider of electronic communications 
services may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly route, 
terminate, and otherwise manage the individual messages they contain.  These 
monitoring functions, which may be necessary to the provision of an electronic 
communication service, do not involve humans listening in on voice conversations.  
Accordingly, they are not prohibited.  In contrast, the traditional limits on service 
“observing” and random “monitoring” do refer to human aural interceptions and 
are retained with respect to voice or “wire” communications. 
 
(Wong Decl., Ex. BB at 20 (emphasis added).)  Based on this legislative history, a reasonable 
jurist could adopt a broad reading of § 2510(5)(a)(ii)—Congress simply was not concerned about 
the type of scanning presented here that does not “involve humans listening in on voice 
conversations.”  Id. 
It is important to bear in mind that, in 1986, Congress could not have had an inkling of the 
vast presence that online activity would have in everyday lives in 2013.  The word “Internet” does 
not appear once in ECPA’s legislative history.  See also Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 
500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005) (“To understand Congress’ intent it is important to note that Internet 
technology has advanced significantly since Congress enacted ECPA in 1986.”).  While the 
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legislative history above states that ECS providers “may” have to monitor transmissions to 
properly “route, terminate, and otherwise manage” emails, there is no indication that Congress 
intended to limit ECS monitoring only to such tasks—otherwise, Congress would have expressly 
imposed a statutory limit on ECS providers, as it did for wire communications service providers.  
Thus, reasonable grounds exist for construing Congress’s failure to limit to ECS providers as 
supporting a broad reading of § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
Third, the case law upon which the Court relies reasonably could be viewed as supporting 
Google’s motion to dismiss.  Indeed, the Court cites to no controlling authority in support of its 
interpretation of § 2510(5)(a)(ii), instead relying solely on decisions outside this Circuit, none of 
which is directly on point and none of which interprets the statute as narrowly as this Court, 
creating tension between the holdings of this Court and those of the Second and Tenth Circuits.  In 
Hall, for example, the Second Circuit relied on the “ordinary course of its business” exception to 
affirm the dismissal of an ECPA claim brought against an ISP where the plaintiff alleged that the 
ISP continued processing his emails after he terminated his account.  See 396 F.3d at 504-05.  The 
processing of emails to a closed account did not facilitate and was not instrumental to the ECS, 
nor was it incidental to the functioning of the ECS, yet the Second Circuit held that such 
processing was not an “interception.”  Id.  While this Court distinguished Hall on the ground that 
Earthlink “continued to receive and store emails after an account was cancelled” and that Earthlink 
“did not have the ability to bounce e-mail back to senders after the termination of the account” 
(Order at 16), neither of these distinctions explains why it was instrumental, as part of Earthlink’s 
provision of the business of email services, to continue processing emails to closed accounts.  A 
reasonable jurist could conclude that Hall supports the conclusion that a business reason (e.g., 
storing email in case a former customer asks for it) could fall within the scope of § 2510(5)(a)(ii), 
even if it was not incidental to the provision of the email system itself. 
Similarly, in Kirch v. Embarq Management Co., 702 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2012), the 
Tenth Circuit held that Embarq, in allowing NebuAd to run a technology test related to 
advertising, was protected by the exception because Embarq had “no more of its users’ electronic 
communications than it had in the ordinary course of its business as an ISP.”  Thus, Kirch looked 
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from a historical standpoint  at defendant’s ongoing, entire business, not just at the particular 
interceptions at issue.  This Court distinguished Kirch on the grounds that “Embarq itself did not 
review any of the raw data that NebuAd collected.”  (Order at 15.)  Kirch, however, made no 
finding that if Embarq had collected and reviewed such data as an ordinary, ongoing part of its 
business, such a review would be an “interception.”  To the contrary, the district court in that case 
noted that the “ordinary course of its business” defense “appears to have merit, as plaintiffs have 
admitted that Embarq conducted the NebuAd test to further legitimate business purposes and that 
behavioral advertising is a widespread business and is commonplace on the Internet.”  Kirch, 
2011 WL 3651359, at *9 n.42 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011) (emphasis added).11  Thus, Kirch supports 
the application of § 2510(5)(a)(ii) where the ESC is furthering its “legitimate business 
purposes”—including advertising—and is not limited to only those acts that are technically 
necessary to perform email transmission.  Both Hall and Kirch—the only two cases cited by the 
Court addressing § 2510(5)(a)(ii)—found that the exception did apply, and neither held that only 
acts “instrumental” to the technological process of sending an email qualify.  The Order thus is in 
tension with the Second and Tenth Circuits, and guidance from the Ninth Circuit is needed to 
resolve any confusion or inconsistency. 
The Court also cites to a number of decisions construing the “ordinary course of its 
business” exception to § 2510(5)(a)(i) in the context of an employer monitoring employees’ 
telephone and pager calls.  (See Order at 18-19, citing Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 
(6th Cir. 2001); Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th 
Cir. 1983); James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).)  While the Court 
characterizes these cases as holding that “there must be some nexus between the need to engage in 
                                                 
11 The Court suggests that “Google is more akin to NebuAd, which intercepted data for the 
purpose of providing targeted advertising.”  (Order at 15.)  This ignores, however, that:  (1) unlike 
the one-time NebuAd test on Embarq, Google’s scanning is an ordinary and routine part of its 
business; and (2) Google’s targeted advertising is a component of its own integrated services—
unlike NebuAd and Embarq, which were two companies with separate business goals, Google’s 
business includes both the provision of email and targeted advertising, necessarily intertwined. 
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the alleged interception and the subscriber’s ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the 
underlying good or service” (Order at 19), none of these cases required such a narrow connection, 
to the contrary, they suggest the opposite.  Adams, for example, holds that application of the 
exception requires that the use be merely “for a legitimate business purpose.”  250 F.3d at 984.12  
And Berry, 146 F.3d at 1009, noted that “if covert monitoring is to take place it must itself be 
justified by a valid business purpose, or, perhaps, at least must be shown to be undertaken 
normally” (quotation marks and internal citation omitted).  In any event, Google’s automated 
scanning serves not merely “legitimate” and “valid” business purposes, but is fundamental to 
allowing Gmail to continue to operate.  Indeed, effective targeted advertising, achieved through 
the challenged automated scanning, funds Gmail and permits it to continue as a free service—a 
quintessential “nexus.”  Substantial ground thus exists for interpreting this line of cases as 
supporting Google’s argument that its routine practice of automated scanning is for valid, 
legitimate business purposes and thus falls within the protection afforded by the statute. 
Fourth, a reasonable jurist may be persuaded that, under the Court’s test, absurd results 
will necessarily follow.  For example, the Court’s construction of § 2510(5)(a)(ii) arguably would 
manufacture never-ending ECPA cases for the provision of services that are claimed not to be 
“instrumental” to the facilitation or functioning of an ECS, but nonetheless are expected by all 
users.  Using the Court’s analysis, one could conclude that email spell-checking, spam filtering, 
and search indexing are not “instrumental” to the technical transmission of emails, but the 
presence of such features cannot realistically be perceived as giving rise to ECPA violations—
they, like targeted advertising, are part of the ordinary business of providing an effective email 
service, expected by consumers.13 
                                                 
12 See also, e.g., Arias, 202 F.3d at 559 (“[l]egitimate business reasons”); Watkins, 704 F.2d at 
582 (“if the intercepted call was a business call, then [employer’s] monitoring of it was in the 
ordinary course of business”). 
13 The Court discounts any danger to such generally accepted email services on the ground that 
they may fall within a narrow definition of “ordinary course of its business” or may be protectable 
by attaining user consent.  (See Order at 20 n.4.)  But the Order indisputably creates uncertainty 
about whether and when such services are protected under ECPA, underscoring the need for the 
Ninth Circuit’s guidance. 
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Further, the Order is in fundamental tension with a recent opinion from this District that 
dismissed ECPA claims as applied to Gmail services.  See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 
2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012).  There, Judge Grewal noted that the “plain language 
of [ECPA] … excludes from the definition of a ‘device’ a provider’s own equipment used in the 
ordinary course of business.”  Id. at *6 (emphasis added); see also id. at *5 (use of a “device” 
under ECPA “cannot include Google’s own systems”).  Here, Google’s automated scanning 
technologies are Google’s own “devices.”  Given the disconnect between Judge Grewal’s decision 
and the Order, both the instant parties and future parties would be best served by receiving 
guidance from the Ninth Circuit to provide clarity on these issues. 
Finally, the Court offered an alternative ground for finding that the “ordinary course of its 
business” exception is inapplicable: namely, that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Google has 
violated its own internal policies and is therefore acting outside the ordinary course of business.  
(Order at 20-22.)  For this argument, the Court cites only Berry, where the D.C. Circuit found that 
the State Department Operations Center’s internal guidelines “clearly indicate the norm of 
behavior [phone monitors] were to follow.”  146 F.3d at 1010.  Substantial ground exists, 
however, for rejecting the Court’s position because it notices to third-party customers in the TOS 
and Privacy Policy are not “internal policies” akin to the internal guidelines distributed to call 
monitors at the State Department.  To the contrary, Google’s automated scanning is its standard 
norm of behavior.  To state a claim of a violation of an “internal policy,” Plaintiffs must offer 
allegations as to “internal policies” that Google adopted and how it violated those internal 
standards.  Plaintiffs have not done so.  And even if Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy could 
somehow be construed as internal policies, Google did not violate such policies, as Plaintiffs 
consented to the activities at issue.  See infra, Point II.14 
                                                 
14 To the extent that substantial ground for difference of opinion exists as to the examples Google 
lists of information it may collect from users (Order at 21), Google addresses this argument in the 
discussion of consent.  See infra, Point II.  Any suggestion that Google violated its own internal 
polices because it purportedly did not provide notice of such collection improperly conflates the 
two inquiries.  See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.). 
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C. Certification of the “Ordinary Course of Its Business” Question May 
Materially Advance the Termination of the Litigation 
Immediate appeal of the Order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  This factor does not “require[] that the interlocutory appeal have 
a final, dispositive effect on the litigation, only that it ‘may materially advance’ the litigation.”  
See Reese, 643 F.3d at 688.  Whether certification will materially advance the termination of the 
litigation “is closely related to the question of whether an issue of law is ‘controlling’ ‘in that the 
[district court] should consider the effect of a reversal … on the management of the case.”  
Lakeland Village Homeowners Ass’n v. Great Am. Ins. Group, 727 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (E.D. 
Cal. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
If the Ninth Circuit agrees that the Order too narrowly construes § 2510(5)(a)(ii) and 
reverses the Order, this action might well be entirely terminated.  Particularly in a class action, 
interlocutory appeal saves judicial and party resources that might be wasted on class-certification 
motions, expert discovery, and fact discovery, all of which might well be unnecessary should the 
Ninth Circuit reverse.  See, e.g., Helman, 2009 WL 2058541, at *6 (particularly in “complex” 
cases, “[i]t would be preferable for the Court of Appeals to address the issue now, rather than to 
require the parties and to expend significant time and resources, which might ultimately be 
wasted”).15 
II. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE QUESTION OF THE PROPER SCOPE 
OF THE “PRIOR CONSENT” EXCEPTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) 
Liability under ECPA is also foreclosed where a party to the communication consents to an 
interception: 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law 
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party 
to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the 
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution 
or laws of the United States or of any State. 
 
                                                 
15 For the reasons noted above, see supra fn. 7, if the Court determines that the “ordinary course 
of business” exception warrants interlocutory appellate review, the Court need not even proceed to 
the second issue presented, as the entire Order would be certified. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
On the issue of consent, this Court concluded (Order at 24) that the TOS did not 
sufficiently inform users that it would “intercept emails for the purposes of creating user profiles 
or providing targeted advertising” and (id. at 26) that the Privacy Policies “do not specifically 
mention the content of users’ emails to each other or to or from non-users” and thus “are not broad 
enough to encompass such interceptions.”  The Court also found that non-Gmail users did not 
impliedly consent to Google’s automated scanning of emails sent, because accepting that theory 
“would eviscerate the rule against interception.”  (Order at 27.) 
The Court’s ruling on the application of the consent exception in § 2511(2)(d) involves a 
controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and as 
to which an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 
A. Whether Plaintiffs Consented to Automated Scanning Pursuant to 
§ 2511(2)(d) Is a Controlling Question of Law 
The Court’s interpretation of Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy to determine whether they 
establish consent under § 2511(2)(d) is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.  See, e.g., 
MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district 
court’s interpretation and meaning of contract provisions is reviewed de novo.”); Doe I v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Contract interpretation is a question of law 
that we review de novo.”); Lively, 456 F.3d at 938 (interpretation and construction of federal 
statute reviewed de novo).  As the Court based its ruling both on its interpretation of contractual 
terms and on its construction of a provision of ECPA, this issue presents a question of law. 
For reasons similar to those discussed above, see supra Point I.A., the issue is 
“controlling” because “resolution of the issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of 
litigation in the district court.”  In re Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1026.  While it is not necessary 
for a reversal to completely terminate an action to be controlling, circumstances where reversal 
will terminate the action are, by definition, “controlling.”  See Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24.  If the 
Ninth Circuit reverses the Order on de novo review and finds that all Plaintiffs—Gmail users and 
non-Gmail users alike—necessarily consented to Google’s automated scanning, the entire case 
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would be terminated.  Even if the Ninth Circuit reverses only as to consent of Gmail users but not 
to consent of non-Gmail users, the scope of the action would be significantly narrowed, removing 
a large, discrete segment of class-action plaintiffs from the case. 
Finally, much like the “ordinary course of its business” exception, the “prior consent” 
question presents an issue of great importance to future litigation and to Internet-based business 
and Internet users.  Id.  Whether (1) Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy are sufficient to provide 
notice here; and (2) websites are required to list every conceivable purpose of every conceivable 
use of a user’s information in its terms of service, are both issues likely to arise in the future that 
could direct the course of how such provisions are written.  Businesses and users alike could only 
be served by receiving clarity on this important issue.  See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union, 802 F. 
Supp. at 30. 
B. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion Exists as to Whether Plaintiffs 
Consented to Automated Scanning Pursuant to § 2511(2)(d) 
While the Court ruled that Gmail users’ acquiescence to Google’s TOS and Privacy 
Policies does not establish explicit or implied consent, a fair-minded jurist reviewing Google’s 
policies could reach a contrary conclusion, satisfying the second § 1292(b) factor. 
Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy (which is incorporated into the TOS), read together, put 
Gmail users on express notice that Google may use information gathered from their use of 
Google’s integrated services—which include Gmail—to improve and develop its services, which 
include targeted advertising and the alleged user profiles.16  On an appropriate construction of 
§ 2511(2)(d), a reasonable jurist considering the text of these policies could find that Gmail users 
expressly consented to automated scanning of emails in connection with Google’s provision of its 
services.  See, e.g., Kirch, 2011 WL 3651359, at *7-9 (consent based on terms of service); 
Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., 2011 WL 1842859, at *1-3 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011) (granting 
                                                 
16 In addition, through March 2012, Google had a Gmail-specific Legal Notice, which informed 
Gmail users that Google “will not use any of your content for any purpose except to provide you 
with the Service.”  (Compl. ¶ 121) (emphasis added). Because “your content” logically means “the 
content of your emails,” this notice, when read in connection with Google’s TOS and Privacy 
Policy, further notified Google users their “content” may be used to provide them with Google’s 
services. 
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motion to dismiss ECPA claim based on consent to privacy policy); Mortensen v. Bresnan 
Commc’n, L.L.C., 2010 WL 5140454, at *5 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010) (similar).  Thus, substantial 
ground exists for disagreement with the Court. 
First, while the Court acknowledged that Section 8 of the TOS notified users that “content 
may be intercepted” (Order at 24), the Court nonetheless held that Gmail users did not consent to 
such automated scanning of their emails for the specific purposes for which Plaintiffs now 
complain.  (See, e.g., Order at 23 (“the Court finds that it cannot conclude that any party … has 
consented to Google’s reading of email for the purposes of creating user profiles or providing 
targeted advertising”) (emphasis added); 24 (TOS suggests that content may be intercepted “for a 
different purpose” but “[t]his does not suggest to the user that Google would intercept emails for 
the purposes of creating user profiles or providing targeted advertising.”) (emphasis added); id. 
(“to the extent that section 8 of the Terms of Service establishes consent, it does so only for the 
purpose of interceptions to eliminate objectionable content”) (emphasis added).)  Substantial 
ground exists for disagreement with this construction of “consent.” 
The text of § 2511(2)(d) provides no indication that “consent” is purpose-specific, nor does 
the Court cite to any authority that the exception is so narrowly construed.17  Rather, the statute 
states that it is the interception itself to which a party provides consent.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(d) (it is not unlawful “to intercept a[n] … electronic communication where … one of 
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception”) (emphasis added).  
Indeed, the statute lists specific purposes that are not protected by the exception:  “the purpose of 
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or of any State.”  Id.  The plain text of the statute thus provides that, once a party consents 
                                                 
17 Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)—which the Court cites to for this 
point—is inapposite.  (Order at 24.)  In Watkins, the plaintiff consented to the monitoring of her 
sales calls, but did not consent to the monitoring of her personal calls.  Id. at 581.  The plaintiff did 
not argue, nor did the 11th Circuit hold, that a legitimately monitored sales call could not be 
consented to if the company used the monitoring of that business call for a different purpose.  In re 
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003), which the Court also cites, makes this point.  There, 
plaintiffs “insisted there be no collection of personal data,” id. at 20, and thus the initial 
interception was not consented to. 
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to an interception, “such interception” may be used by the recipient if it is not “for the purpose of 
committing any criminal or tortious act”—otherwise, the subsequent language addressing 
prohibited purposes would be superfluous.  Thus, under ECPA, a relevant consent is to the act of 
interception, not to any purpose of that interception unless the purpose is to commit a criminal or 
tortious act.  Other decisions are in accord that, once a party to a communication consents to the 
interception itself, the purpose for such interception is immaterial.  See, e.g., Chance v. Avenue A, 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162-63 (W.D. Wash. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Creative 
Computing v. Getloaded.com, LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (act of interception protected by 
§ 2511(d)(2), as long as interception was not for a criminal or tortious purpose).18 
Giving this statutory text its plain meaning, a fair-minded jurist could conclude that, 
because Plaintiffs do not allege that Google’s automated scanning of emails was for the purpose of 
committing a criminal or tortious act, Plaintiffs consented to the automated scanning of emails 
regardless of the purpose for interception—and certainly consented to Google using the 
intercepted material for the purpose of facilitating use of integrated Google services.  Where 
statutory language is clear, “judicial inquiry must cease.”  Services Emps. Int’l Union, 718 F.3d at 
1045.  And if there were any doubt, it is resolved by clear precedent that “‘consent’ must be 
construed broadly under the Wiretap Act.”  In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 
497, 514 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The fact that remedies may lie under other legal provisions for 
certain misuses of procured information have no bearing on this basic point.  
The same basis provides reasonable grounds to conclude that both Gmail and non-Gmail 
users impliedly consented to the automated scanning of emails sent to or from Gmail users.  
Plaintiffs concede that the automated processing of emails—including Google’s scanning of 
content of emails for spam and virus detection—is widely known.  (See, e.g., ECF No. 53 at 2 (not 
contesting public awareness that email content is scanned “to filter out spam or detect computer 
                                                 
18 See also Orin Kerr, Is Gmail Illegal? at http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/04/is-gmail-illegal/ 
(Oct. 4, 2013) (“In the case of Gmail’s policies, Gmail users were put on notice as to the 
interception.  Whether they knew about what would happen after the interception occurred is 
immaterial to the consent.”). 
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viruses” (modifications omitted).)  Further, every reputable provider of email services offers such 
features.  Thus, when Gmail and non-Gmail users impliedly consented to the content of their 
emails being scanned by Google for spam or virus detection, the use of such scanning for other 
non-tortious or non-criminal purposes did not give rise to an ECPA violation.19  Such a reading 
avoids the need for the Court to look to the TOS or Privacy Policies to determine express consent, 
as implied consent is already present.  At a minimum, a fair-minded jurist could reasonably 
understand the text of § 2511(2)(d) to require such an outcome. 
Second, the Court’s apparent requirement that Google list every purpose for which 
material is collected with specificity is impracticable to satisfy without rendering the policy far 
less accessible to users, due to increased length, complexity, and excessive detail.  Google’s TOS 
and Privacy Policy are written in such a way to make it more likely that users will read and 
understand the terms—they use general terms and provide a few examples in easy-to-understand 
language.  If Google and other technology companies were suddenly forced to describe and 
explain in detail every purpose for which every piece of data is used, terms of service and privacy 
policies would be lengthy and incomprehensible.  The level of specificity the Order requires 
would also require companies to revise their terms of service and privacy policies every time they 
add or revise features to existing products or alter how they use data to implement existing 
features—an impracticable task given the speed and frequency at which Google and other 
technology companies innovate. 
The same applies to the Court’s suggestion that users did not consent to automated 
scanning of their email because email is not specifically listed among Google’s list of examples of 
in its TOS and Privacy Policies of which information it collects.  Google (like most companies) 
provides broad, general language notifying users that it collects information relating to users’ 
interactions with its services.  (See, e.g., Rothman Decl, Ex. E at § 17.1 (“advertisements may be 
targeted to the content of information stored on the Service, queries made through the Service or 
                                                 
19 For this reason, substantial ground exists for difference of opinion on the remaining state-law 
claims, as both parties consent to the acts of interception at issue. 
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other information”); id. § 8.3 (“Google reserves the right … to pre-screen, review, flag, [or] filter 
… any or all Content from any Service.”) (emphasis added); Ex. J (“We also use the information 
we collect from all of our services to provide, maintain, protect and improve them, to develop new 
ones…. We use this information to offer you tailored content….” (emphasis added).)  It would be 
commercially impracticable and unduly burdensome for websites to specifically list every possible 
way that information might be collected when general, easily understood terms (such as 
“services”) much more clearly inform users of the website’s overall practices.  And to avoid any 
confusion on that point, in employing language of examples, Google indicates such lists are not 
exclusive by using words such as “include” or “in addition to.”  (See ECF No. 56, App. A.); see 
United States v. Gertz,  249 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1957) (“The word ‘includes’ is usually a term 
of enlargement, and not of limitation”). 
Third, the Court separately criticized Section 17 of Google’s TOS because it states that 
“advertisements may be targeted to the content of information,” and not will be targeted.  (Order at 
25.)  A fair-minded jurist, however, could find that the Court misconstrued the word “may.”  In 
the TOS, the word “may” means that Google has permission to target advertisements to content.  
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (9th ed. 2009) (first definition of “may” is “[t]o be permitted 
to”); BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 2011 WL 2116989, at *20 (D. Haw. May 
25, 2011) (citing BLACK’S).  Any other construction of “may” would encourage a tortured reading 
of the TOS—why would Google inform users that advertisements “might” be targeted, if not to 
notify users of the likelihood that it would occur?20  As such, courts generally accept that using the 
word “may” provides sufficient notice of events.  See, e.g., Deering, 2011 WL 1842859 at *1-2 
(notice valid where TOS disclosed that certain information “may” be collected).  
                                                 
20 The Court’s only authority for this point is Berry.  (Order at 25.)  In Berry, however, the Court 
ruled that knowing about the “capacity” to monitor telephone calls was not sufficient evidence of 
notice that monitoring would happen.  146 F.3d at 1011.  That is, capacity does not automatically 
equal possible action.  This Court’s interpretation of “may,” however, demonstrates a likelihood, 
not merely an ability, to target ads.  See United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030, 1048 n.17 
(8th Cir. 2012) (where “may” used to express possibility, “‘may’ … expresses likelihood whereas 
‘might’ expresses a stronger sense of doubt”).  Further, the Court’s construction contradicts almost 
every employee monitoring case, where employees are informed of the possibility of monitoring. 
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C. Certification of the “Prior Consent” Question May Materially Advance the 
Termination of the Litigation 
For the same reasons discussed above, see supra Point I.C., immediate appeal “may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  If the Ninth 
Circuit finds that Plaintiffs consented to Google’s automated scanning and reverses the Order, the 
action may be terminated in its entirety.  And because the case is at such an early stage, resolution 
of such a threshold issue at the outset will save the parties and the Court significant time and 
resources by avoiding potentially unnecessary discovery and motion practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should certify the Order for interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b). 
 
DATED: October 9, 2013   COOLEY LLP 
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